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Why wei,t» a thesis on Ksnagiag Engineering Hanpovor while enrolled in
A graduate prograa In financial aaaagenent? There are three prijaary reasons.
The first is obvious. Manpower costs money. The second and third reasons
are, perhaps, aore obscure.
The writer is a Havy Civil Engineer Corps officer, While all CEC
officers devote their lives to service to the Havy, they wtrk in the internal
operations of the Havy through the Bureau of Yards and Docks. They direct
the contribution the Bureau askes to the Wavy.
There are a ousaber of opinions about what this contribution is or
should be—about v?hat the real purpose of the Bureau is. The objectives of
the Bureau and the Civil Engineer Corps have been stated with brevity and
clarity b^ the chief of the Bureau in a recent booklet called siapiy,
ss. The objectives ares
1. To direct the Civil Engineering effort in the Havy
toward:
(a) Attaining masis&sa effectiveness and ecoaoiay
throughout the Havel Shore Establislsaeat by efspieyoent of the
best engineering practices in the conduct of governmental
business,
(b) Supporting to the susHramn possible csttent the
military retirements of the Chief of Naval Operations and
the Cccxaandant of the Marine Corps.
2. To extend Civil Engineer Corps and Bureau of tarda
and Docks services Into those areas where the job can be ,
dene most effectively by a military engineering organisation,
*U. S. Department of the Havy, Bureau of lards md Docks* Precepts .
November, 1961, p* I,

A study of thitt statement of objective*, stripping sway the
superlatives and the modifiers, reveals the basic ingredient, civil engineering
effort. The business of the bureau and the corps then, it seems to the
writer, is to provide the Sievy the superior professional technical assistance
in eivil engineering it needs to do its aisuion. The second reason for
writing on managing engineering manpower la now more apparent. This is the
business in which the writer considers his parent organisations to he
The third reason for writing on this subject is more general. For
years, on a periodic basis, the national spotlight has been turned on the
shortage of engineers. The fact that the interest is periodic is
significant. Xt points to the fact that no workable solution of the national
problem has been found, The writer feels that n. worthwhile contribution
toward solution can be made by following through, from the general to the
specific, the study of a particular facet of the larger problem} that by
laying out a practical solution to a particular situation a way may be shown
toward partial solution of the overall problem of an inadequate supply to
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On February 15, 1962, the all Street Journal carried an editorial,
*'Thc Engineers." She editorial writer looked bade to hi* hi$i school days
in the 1930* s and reminisced. He recalled bis guidance counselor warning
against pursuing an engineering career. "There was, he said, a super-
abundance of engineers, and he urged us all to choose a career that offered
a more promising future*"
In the thirty plus years since that tixae the relationship between
supply and demand for engineers has fluctuated up and down* During World
Uar XI there vma real concern that the supply of engineers would be
inadequate to taeet the military challenge.^ When the war exk^d, the concern
was that the supply vould not raeet the expanding needs of the nation* 3 3ut
in January of 1950* the Engineers Joint Council oxpregflf^d the fear that the
men due to be graduated from engineering colleges in June could not he used
H .IH l II* m i l l l l ll in Ill I I— «* i l l II* Ml » » n III! Ill i n———*J——I I Il l—»»»»«—ct—«»*»
Wall Street Journal. Sebruary 15, 1962.
*aenry H, Armsby. %fstoff||ffi HRQqjffltfffifabffmggfflk '• s « Bopt- of





2effectively by Irukiattyfr It took the partial mobilisation for Korea to
force recognition of the real limitation on the engineering resources of the
nation.
there ware some whose concern for the problem did not fluctuate.
In April of 1950* the journal of the Office of Education, Higher £<3ucatioru
stated that diminishing freshman classes in 1946 and the growing demand for
engineers should serve to warn of an impending shortage in 1953. 5 these
expert a had reckoned without the Korean conflict. The shortage arrived full
grown in 1950.
the factor which had prompted the Engineers Joint Council to fear
that the June, 1950 engineering graduates uould have difficulty finding Jobs
was the record high of 52,732 first professional or bachelors degrees
granted that year. In sharp contrast to the 1950 record high was the
graduating class of 1954. 6 That year leas than 12 per cent of all
professional or bachelors degrees granted were in engineering. The number
was only 22,236. In the face of this drop, the Bureau of Labor Statistics
estimated 30,000 engineering graduates would be needed each year to restore
losses and to is&ep pace with new needs*•
I——— i m i ii m i i n m in i i immmmmmammmmmmm»—— iii m iii i n mmmmmm i n mm~~^~mm»m-mmm-mimmmm*^mmm*mmmmm+m~-mmmm~m*m*mm.
4ibid.
5
"Englnee?s«"»¥oo Hany or loo Few," Higher Educetion. April, 1950.
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ng. , 2nd Sees., I95e.
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During this period there were those in the country who were
increasingly concerned over the fact that the 0.S.S.R. was exerting
tremendous national effort to provide veil trained technical leadership. In
1954, the U.S.S.R. graduated 53,000 aea and woaea with bachelors or
equivalent degrees in engineering. 5 Xhese engineers have added to the force
causing the sapid expansion in the economy of the Soviets, our relentleaa
coMpetitors in the cold war*
In 1356, the Joint Ganaittea on Atoaic Energy of the Halted State©
Congress held extensive hearings on the subject of engineering and scientific
manpower in the United States, Western Europe, and Soviet 3usala. One of the
items in that report was a forecast of graduation* in the Halted States in









She report also contained an estimate that the engineering population of the
United States In 1356 was slightly over 500,000 and that the engineering
population of the U« &•£.&» in the same year was larger than our own—nearly
600,000.
By 1957, the percentage of freetoaen who enrolled is, engineering. In
U. S* colleges and universities was down to 10.0 per cent. * The trend has
been down ever since. Even the evidence of iUissien ability in technical
1
*°Ibid.
""tawnd for Engineers to Double," VmAmmtM ffevs-Bftcorc,
e"^ww^^ete*^^*4p w JL ™* *• **•' *—* a jr~^ w^\f s

areas shown by the launching of Sputnilt X on October 4, 1957, has caused no
reversal of this trend. It is true that scisntif1c and engineering programs
fox defease in the Obited States have been stimulated lay aggressive pressures
from the SU.S.R,, but no major effort has been cade to increase the auabcr
of U* Si engineering candidates going into universities and colleges,
la I960* the Bureau of Labor Statistics fftttriraa&fiKfll the engineering
population in the Itoited States to be 648, 500. *^ 2n t^ &|ga6. y^ax 9nxv
7.3 per cent of freebraau college enrollment was in engineering. i2 1Mb was
not only a drop in percentage, hut also ta absolute nusabers. In 1360,
emgiaeering graduates numbered 37,800.U this was just under the estimate
Side is not solving this problem, after a nesting held in early
a space administration official commented, "as we look ahead, our most
critical need seems to be for mere engineer-scientists, for engineering-
Hutt«a«M
A look into the future by the Bureau of Labor Statistics show a
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5population of 1960. In order to meet that figure there would have to be
a net gain, not counting deaths and switches to other professions, of 52,000
«**»» mm y**.« m *ai *»« j-i MNMUI^ in the am
paragraph of this chapter ended this way:
For when the Government says that the nation urgently will
need 72,GOO engineering graduates every year for the neat decade,
we can't help recalling that guidance counselor. And how the
planners' prophecies often don't turn out as neatly as they
should, 19
The difficulty is that even if the estimate is over the actual need
by 80 per cent, we are still not meeting the demand.
In summary than, during the period 1900 to 1950 the engineering
population grew twice as fast as the population in general. There have bean
tinea whan there were more engineers than were needed. But in recent years
there has been en fn^r*»ft»ii^g demand far tunglnaera and scientists. Projections
of future deoando, even discounting large errors in forecasting, are greater
than the supply will be. It is apparent that the efforts that have been
aade to increase the supply of engineering graduates to meet the greater
demand have been unsuccessful. Share is no indication that a massive program
to offset the deficiency is in the offing.
He have been discussing the critical problem of the coming shortage
of engineering manpower. In order properly to set the stage for what follows
l8
3ta «fcU $%m$ ftiffmtfu l*&~£i&.*
l9Ibid .

*the tera 'engineering nanpower" should be clarified. The reader will
undoubtedly have a general Idea of the raeaniag of the term, tut in order
better to comprehend what follows a acre specific understanding is required*
First* it nuat be made clear that **** en&inear Is *wifrtwy a **—***"»r
es^im •J** • ^^a» ^4«**^najfc«F **^^nt^wneTn e asw»» ^ha* iM1* •mmav wwwwe i^^i^nfefc^sGw^paw^nsa^^a- •iw^aew *• wi#wwwpt a
a professional csapleyee. Her is the engineer a scientist*
A true scientist agenda his energies working in the scientific
taethod; as a matter of fact be becones part of it. The scientist
oakes ccntrolied (well directed) observation©, forsas proper
hypotheses, performs experiraents to teat the hypotheses against
several references, foros theories, extends the theories to
predictions to stake the theories useful, and finally, establishes
controls over the use of his work. 1**
an engineer, on the other hand, is alaply occupied with setting a job done.
Engineers use, in particular cases, what scientists have shown to be true
for generalities. Engineer* are people technically trained in the use of
mathematics and baaic scientific principles, and their reason for being tttwn
to be that their knowledge and skills will be productive of a better life
at less cost* 22
Brothers, 1954), p. 331.
21Edward Harris, "An Engineer is not a Scientist.. .and Vice Versa,"
JWritte -'^liafccr (July, -?01), || ,.,.
22

Having established the fact of the existence of * shortage of
engineering manpower and having **$$*&* the term, the next step is to
suggest ways this shortage might he relieved. The first, to increase the
upon. 3% is obvious from the statistics presented above that a major effort
is needed to increase engineering enrollment in colleges and universities.
One finds the emphasis is the literature on the subject of the shortage of
esigineerins manpower is on this method of solving the problem* £here is
so <|uestioa but what this is the only method by which the problem can be
solved in the long run*
However, in the short ran a temporary solution can be provided by
using mora effectively the existing supply of trained personnel* A study
made in 1937, by the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration^
indicated that much of the so-called shortage of engineering staff was at
that time the result of industry* 3 misuse of the existing manpower pool.
In 1956, the Engineers Joint Council at the second general assembly
that heavy reliance be placed on effective utilization of engineers rather
than solely upon attempting to increase their numbers* In an article in
the August, 1961, Consttfcffflg ffinffiffflftf*- ^^ Gi**ad indicates that even were
there not as engineer shortage, there would still be a need for effective
i—nwpi Bii n iim \iwmm**im w*mm—»m\\ t \ —> »mmmmmmmmmM»mmmm*m mmum *N»«*MM«»»»**ww«*«*waw*»«»i*iw*^^
23Gcor®s A* von Peterffy, ''Getting; Wore Mileage from Your Engineering
Staff, ' 3fce, Hansflccymt %yl^ > (Augpst, 1953).

management of engineering manpower. For as he points out* "a consulting
engineer's office can. be defined as a monster that devours large quantities
of oeh e«U «*.»**
Ad we shall see, the steps that lead to more effective utilization
of Use existing supply of engineers also help increase the number of people
entering the field. This la eo because as engineers are hatter utilised,
the profession becomes more attractive.
this introduction has so far focused attention on the fact that a
serious problem exists in the shortage of engineering aannover. From this
point on the emphasis will be placed on improving engineering taanpower
utilisation. Seas Ideas and practices designed to fcapreve engineering
manpower utilisation which axa in the literature will be reviewed. Then,
a program will be outlined for use t& the engineering organisations of the
Since the last part of the paper will deal with the Bureau of tarda
and Dock*, its engineering functions (at least those with which we will he
dealing) should he described. Uhlle many of the imrngtmrtt techniques and
practices discussed herein are applicable to die general field of engineering
practice, this paper is slanted toward the kind of engineering done by the
•fo^yfrifli god its field organisations.
mum m—»
—
m 'i n "m li'Uli.n.in iuk i i n iainn i » n m i . > m u in n m il » n mm j. ». mil ' .ii.ii> i n
24John Oirand, "Engineering froductivity,..What's Wrong With Honey
As a Measure?,w qm^tlMllm&mmt <*»8MSt, 1961), p, *t»

913* objective of the departraeatal level (the Washington office) of
the Bureau of Yards sad Docks in the field of engineering; end design is to
develop the architectural and engineering policies, criteria, and practice*
for the eceaaaieal construction and design of shore facilities Which will
beet satisfy the functional requirement. 25 A brief of the Engineering end
Design Program i» included in Preceota.
Hie Engineering and design Progras includes the development
repetitive type structures; definitive designs for the moat
efficient end ffiwwffvt^a* space arrangement to woofi functional
requirements; complex and specialised design guidance;
preliminary engineering and project design reviews; engineering
consultant eerviees and investigations, nuclear engineering;
fire protection engineering; technical specifications end cost
date infonaation; m& associated technical support services.*®
The Bureau end its engineering field organisation, the Directors'
offices and the District Public tfwfcs Offices, accomplish all engineering
investigations, feasibility studies* planning studies and designs for the
Navel Shore Facilities Construction Program* and for other governaeat
agencies as requested. A portion of this work is done ;in house*" but the
largest amount of it has h&m done through the use of architect-engineer
fines. It is the policy of the Bureau of Yards and Docks in this connection*
that
• . * a sufficient number of design projects of broad
scope and cotaplesisy will be retained "in house" to provide
for continued staff development , capability* and high level
and Dochs or its field activities.*'
h i « iiiaiK.Mi ..m i »
-
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In order to illustrate the present attitude of management toward
managing engineers it is necessary to trace the development of management
of conventional manpower. This approach is necessary, because management
tends to treat all workers alike. This discussion of msnagsnent of
conventional manpower will provide a reasonable base from which to move to
a discussion of managing engineers.
The history of oystematie, thoughtful, scientific attempts to control
manpower is quite short. Until recently the social structure of
to control was based on force, strength, and the will of strong man. It It
important to realise and understand that the roota of authoritarian
autocratic leadership are deep seated in the pass:. Throughout the greater
part of the history of civilisation, the satisfaction of physiological and
security needs in a vicious and dangerous world was the paramount concern
of most men.* Their every effort was beat towards setting for themselves
speech by Dr. Gordon Lippitt, Head, Behavioral Sciences department,
The George Washington University, August 31, 1961.
10

and their feaiUes food, suites: and protection, la the lawless world of
loyalty, the serfs »*nd peasants struck # bargain for food, shelter and
aacuri
The beginning of the change away fros authoritarian autocratic
the selection and rejection of the leadership was mde on a free basis by
these to be lea. The purpose of structuring the leadership, the spvannMt*
uas to provide an cnvirooBieafc in which thece selecting the leadership could
pursue their own g&als in safety without fear. Even in this environssent
it took over one hundred years for the writing rsaa to establish htaseif
,
to organise his strength, and to exert his passer to change the social
«nrlxnoncnt. Hoover, change then be did; and as a result of these changes,
fear has bean largely eliminated as a motivating force in the workplace.
It is significant to note that Peter Druc&er attributes the
elimination of this nocivetion to increased Health produced by
industrialisation* .'Scientific ^anagoffmnt technigses, techniques con-.arnad
saialy with the p* Ml involved in production, were responsible for the
giant steps Bade in Industrialization. The effort was largely directed
toward staking the processes as sfcaplc and efficient as possible. The worker





process. TaLs approach was consistent with the authoritarian autocrat
point <i2 view* Jtkit uan is S0t a machine. JL his standard of living has
improved, the i imm has become Ulaaatisficu with -/hat he gets from his
job. Food, shelter i .rity, and material goods are inadequate cenpeaaa.
The worker wanta to he recognised aa a nan and to exercise some rights.
la has become better educated, less sat la tl* Si.
Xay . cicntific manaaaaeat techniques brought tremendous improvements
and were accepted by the worker, albeit c of 1900
is not the ansa as the worker of I960. He is na ic. . he con-
sidered as,
Sight now, this year, the utora rages over imnaywmf doctrine*
According ~as HcGregor of Massachusetts Inatitv. technology*
wwiwjpaoat considers that the average perooa baa an inherent dislike of work
and will avoid it if he can* Homagers feel moat people oust he concroiiee
k hard enough to achieve company objectives, the average
person is not thought very ambitious for respeasibi Managers feel
workers really want to ha guided. McGregor and his -
fasbaviorlsta, particlpetionists, humc.
,
and ao on, reject these
concept .
this group feels the-'. I as natural go men as play & and
that men will work hard toward ends which satisfy thci- . e peep
think the cveragc man to be ambitious and seeking of reaponaibiiity. But
-;ona Over Management Doctrines," Business beck , January 6,
. 72.

they feel traditional management control and direction frustrates all sorts
of undeveloped capabilities
There can be no question that management practices of today have
sprung from the roots of authoritarian autocratic ideas. However, managers
have a responsibility to produce and there is not adequate evidence
that any alternatives to the current approach used by managers will actually
vorfc. In any event, classical tnanageraftut principles are still being used
as &ii.d&& by managers in this country,
''
such for the art of handling conventional workers. It is t iiao to
explore the uniqueness of the engineering mind, .iy
that Drucher states there are three kinds of worliors in enterprise; the
manager, the ordinary uorfcer, and the professional contributor. Baft* is
unique about the professional contribut - a makes us third; he has to be
treated differently? (It is interesting to note tint Brucfcer feels that
the p» -nal contributor oust be treated differently -;>*hcther management:
considers it "necessary" or not,) 5
In trying to establish this uniqueness ye esabarfe. on a cloud covered
path. The only satisfactory \my to caasaine a mind in this sense is to telle
about the uork engineers do and about some of the things they say they think
and fc build a picture of what engineers are like. $e
must bear in mind, however, that any at to group people by type .
.
ter ?. Drucfcer, ^tanaseaeat and the Professional Employee,"
* mtm (May-June, 1952), p.
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filled with peril. No one fits the stereotype.
A key to toe doer of knowledge of this subject is contained in the
Taft-Hartley Law of 1947* It was necessary in that law clearly to define
a professional tsaployee, because saany of the provisions of the icy did not
apply to these people. Xhe law defines a professional employee as any
employee engaged in work:
a. Predominately intellectual avid varied in character aa
opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanica l , or physical work,
b. Involving the consistent exercise of discretion and
judgement in its performance*
c. Of such character that the output produced or the
result accomplished cannot be standardised in relation to a
given period of tine*
Semiring knowledge of an advanced type in a of
science or learning customarily acquired by a long course of
specialised intellectual lastruction and study in an instruction
academic education or from an apprenticeship or from training
in the perfersiaaco of routine mental, manual, or physical
processes. 6
This gives an idea of the kind of mind and personality being considered.
A person raust be intellectually and psychologically suited to do this kind
of work.
It is important that we uttderatand that it is the work these people
do which sets than Apart. Ike chief purpose of a technical organisation,
according to Charles Oreh, III, is ... to briag to bear upon problems of
critical i^iortance the creative iaagi^. »f highly skilled technical
specialists, so that the problems will be solved and the solutions
r* Joint Council, 5aising Professiona,! Standards and
. .
:




transmitted in useable fora to other «KHSponents in the eoapai.
And again, Edward Harris says, "the practice of cagincerins io an
art, and as an art, Ita success depend! considerably on the exercise of
jud~ecient.
Another approach to obtaining an idea of what it is that: sets I
engineering mind apart is an exataination of attitudes and grievances enong
engineers in industry. In January, 1955, Moore and Sench reported the
Its of an "Attitude Survey" of 587 professional employees in nineteen
roups* Morale and attitude posr. The tar
reason cited was:
Chronic dissatisfaction ;>»
: a fundamental cenfli




they feel their rewards do not Batch their 'itaftgnest and
professional cap] . are in ccsiflict c nfl should be
solved. The professional \mata to give a complete ans- Bile management
wants a simple I
^Charles D. Orth, n lore Productivity from Kngir.
HHbMK. .- . . *_-.- ---Jr.. - SQUHK '-.--w ~'' "* I -j "• - • •
,t.
,ial Eiapioyee in
In, Jqurnal of Business (January, 1"55).
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From « professional's standpoint , 'chore is often the feeling
that management does not fen Ls doing. The analytical
mind finds Cite integrative: aind somewhat ine able, perhaps,
» a littli . llity to reach decision® on the
has partial information and vhat might appear to be fit
evidc,. not held in high esteem by the professional. In
fact, in professional circles, this borders on Charlatanism.
In October of 1959, Busfoesa Week reported a study made by Opinion
Seccarch Corporation in vaieh 622 scientists ana engineers in six major
11
corporations ware surveyed. Seventy*tve per cent of the technical people
felt management misused their talent. Eighty per cent said they were
underpaid compared to other groups. Host felt management people got an
unfair share of recognition in the company and in the cosxauni . vent}
per cent thought iaanagesaent tried to manipulate people for their own
purposes and about the same percentage accused executives of oversimplifying
problems, those surveyed thought of their goals as the pursuit of knowledge
for its own sake, and they vented leas pressure from management, freedom
to select their own work, and a flexible. schedule.
Another in nto the engineering mind is provided by William B.
Given, Jr. He points out the weakness of an engineer appointed as a manager.
He confirms that engineers have trouble with intangibles, having been
trained to rely on facts and measurable observations. He feels engineers
unc km importance of attitudes, emotions, customers, traditions,
and prejudices and that they fail to realise t as and bunches toe
l0Xbi .
Engineers, Scientists in Industry Feci 2helr Talents Are Kisusc
ltl£& & October 24, is5i .
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necessary parts of the executive pro Because engineers need largo
maounts of information to make decisions, they as.-: -,iow when placed
in management position* and, as a £itsai nail into the , Mr. Given
1**
says that engineers neglect the developtocnt of people. *
Those --/at ions we have made give a general idea of what goes on
in the engineering ainw We am talking about people, people who are
interested iM ensittacring, Engineering, while its end is to serve people,
is uaiuly concerned with inaniaate objects and static and dynamic £
While many engineers will disagree, nevertheless, engineers tend toward
being introverts rather than extroverts and are not, as a group, poor
oriented* " there are, of course, exceptions, hut, by and large, cnginet
are more interested in their work than they are in people and what makes
people behave as they
finally, the walk in which engineers engage differs front that of
a skilled mechanic in that it is creative and innovative. Engineering It
an art requiring the exercise of a high degree of judgment based on
imieal Za&uledgc gained frost extensive study and experience.
.nee neither engineers themselves nor the v .ich they do la
similar to the other !;iads of people and work manegemenc: has to deal with,
it iWWId seem reasonable boat the methods used to deal with engineers and
to control their work would I .oat* too.
At this point, it seems necessary, in vie jssc of what has been
aaid above, to get back a bit of perspective. One of the cited
Alien S. Ot>^n, Jr. , "The Engineer Goes Into Managpmen
Htovard




Above -jcd the iifcataaoofc that aeventyaiat per cant of the engineers
interviewee thought mm®&ae&£ triad to taeoipulafcc people for its own
purposes.^ What is significant about that steteaeuc is tha .seers
.IC liavc m> I - a of L ! ttanageaent that they W
swu: ..tscoaent at all. Manipulating people is one of the c&>re fcaportent
fan . wauagesaent . The « -r uhich people are laenipulaxcu arc the
ends or goalL .a enterpr:. . tad engineers arc employee solely
further these ends, this point should be o at apparently it is not.
Therefore, it seena necessary to cup'oaalcsc it at this juactuv .
Xbe basic underlying pur ;£ this paper is to scsae light
on how to get aorta an ut of available eogi&u cmqpw&x*
.. . . people trill have to be laanipulated ia oae wsay or anotb .
53bat engineers fin- repugjaaat only reinforces the eonelnaioa that
Peter !>r>. . MM said ia ftp ftfflpqee pf
It baa bccccae alnost a truism ia American nauaseaoat that
the huoan resource all cconosaic ceoou.. be one least
atiy used, and that the greatest opportunity for toproved
ouie perfarasnee lies ia the tuprovoacat c
ia tint oiaeas performs depends
ia the final annly . its ability to pat ..-error,
the;. . J.. .:.:-




Share | m Approve (be problem of nanaging engineering
aaanpouor. Tho first is tarou*; ..an and the sovoad is tbroucfr the w.
She first has to do with ootivatiuc the cssa and the second deals with systesas
controlling the m>rfc. It is apparent that both are needed wA, as would
he , activating an engineer is unlike notiv- 1ft ordinary wrkraan,
and controlling engineerins work is unlihe controlling ordinary work. First,
Motivation.
In en essay published by the Aaericaa Maaageocat Association, George
A, Peters sc surveys aho*r engineers consistently place salary
in "; . , . a relatively low-priority position aaons the tiling they elajg
want in a job.'' 1- He goes on to say that smm credence is lent to this claim
tha £aet that engineers, at the outset, choose e relatively Ions and
difficult college o»rriculuou Shis sane can, of course, he said of any
curriculttH to prepare for a professional career. But it is really
unitiportant to discuss a priority of satisfactions. Xt is apparent that
other things besides pay are important to engineers and evidence indicates
these non-financial condensations are of greater fcapertanea to prof." tmX
';era, such as at s, than non-professional vorhers.
We are fe ith finding ways besides high pay to motivate
engineers. Because of the rigid uage structures loosed on federal soveraoent
agencies enploying engineers, these ideas are of particular interest in the
.erviee. &hat are these non-financial incentives uhlan are thought
to apt... do mora and better
15c > Ifon-ytnaneial Cwapeasatiou for Sag^Laaev
jfrlc-nt , ad. Philip a (few .an
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Peters* essay referred to above contains a list of such incentives.
Shejr are:
1. Opportunity for pro*aotion»»©utside the administrative
chain,
-iffieient pr* .. chell
3. Tolerance of inc. .iity,
5, for professional £ro*?th and for .«al
recogaitl
rkiag conditions and favorable aeaeaphc .
snae of confidence, M>
To include such an Incentive as this under nen*finaacial incentives
secas odd, because preoption implies increased financial reward. However,
in oost -atloas ineer sieves up is tUrou^b the
ado&nistrative chain. The administrator is the osn who is given recognition.
Both V and Brucker point out the. nation to administrative or
saai; .1 jobs la net necc an engineer, * Therefor
a chain of promotion should .liable to compensate for increasing
eetttrl&utions tjy an individual to an m& ..iking Ixisx away
frco the kind of

21
Peters says; "fferhaps the oast frequent deficiency in Aseigu .k
tasks, in tl; I the**. , is the lack of sufficient
professional challenge. They coisplain their work la too eften of the routine
and uniiaa^iaative sort," To this Brucker adds tbe thought that vhiL
assigssaents wust fit the objectives of the enterprise they auat aloo 5f . . .
make sense in the frataeworl, of Professional discipline.
There arc, of ccurse, a nuiaher of reasons for aasignii. ina work
to engineers, fee of these reasons are; there is no one else to do it, or
there la nothing else for the oen to do. loth reasons produce gross waste
of talent And money. The first situation can ha remedied by hiring is
professionals, hi^h „ i sraduc .ience, to do t
'3ils ia n. , . These people have to be trained and the etaployer
oust do the training. The second situation ax ..rota hoexv
*£hen a saaager says, 'hire, all you can g . e*ll find something for "cm
to a is hoarding. This is an understandable approach in a rapidly
expanding business or ia on. xc workload. But there can be no
excuse for it in a business 1 or declini ad. Headed
talent is taken ivm the technical resources of the country and the talent
in allowed to wither frua lack of exorcise and stimulation. In addition,
it ia expensive to the employer.
:i»»
.kv.?.>. ,H&.
*^ferucker, "Stanatgauant and the Professional Ecipl .
Sruckcr, "Maaageoent and the Professional Esaployce;" Herbert .
'.iingtocts The
!
s Coiaaittee on Scientists and Engineers, l.::).

22
It is interesting to note that a ©even-ssenth study of 250 companies
node in I .iarvavd Graduate iichool of Business revealed, emoag
other thing* » that top management hod no grasp of technical empower
-ir«x . anee like this hurts the iiaage of wanayiwwnt in the





A xevlcK/ of the primary factors affectins morale of engineers,
as 1luted by the Engineers Joint Council » indicates management lacks
consideration of the individual engineer as an important human being. '
Britney to try ype cast" people has given rice to what has been
termed aglueer stereotype, r introverted, ©verfactual, inarticulate*
Carlton M. Barlow, Director of Personnel Development at General Dynamics
n» has said, ... engineering graduates are consistently being
thought ,ly as engineers and not as tntonle . . . . are cot only
failing to recognise the engineering graduate as a person, but m are also
filing to toft him m «..»» Tber.omb.oo qrotfam, M CM*. .
Orth, III states simply, that engineers are different from n^n*engineers.
" U. . .,committee on Sasaarch and Dovalopnant of ... .it
Cong.
,







Bt one engineer is different ft nginccr should
not be lost. Engine* re susceptible to i grouping in
one "type 5 ' than of any other U ially traiiv .-p.
- should 1 .-h eon ;ion as a
. individual, he he odd or not. T, : as «t




upport the claim that participation and
?.p decision promote high productivity.-^ Certainly, it seems logical
for management to relate the individual; Li to the poll o. the company.
This is obviously desirable in order to develop I : 1 remain in
the enterprise and contribute to its tad .
One of fca .:ions Drucker makes is t'- ineer .
basinets facts. H adds they prefer the original facto to any toil m
Stt
. . Variou. jested that engine s invited
to participate in the top council c of the enterprise. The Carbcruni
27Company is one x-jhich ...
- wet and Stanley E. : Incr. Utili'
Through Better Management of Human Resou. erinihe. United Jta
*-' - » hi i i ilii imi m» i«» hi m —i* »nia «l i^ifcu —ml mini i—




:UP Mac. ^..Engineering. Talent s p. 106.
~' i< a, "Engineer!] ition at The Carborundum
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la addition to broadening the engineer's outlook and improving his
appreciation o£ uanngeoent proolctas, ceraaanieetioas with the aaa which
relate his to cumflfteaeat will euiiaacc Ifel4 self•estaenu He will feel oore
important, tod it is stoat fcaportant to every cum that he hlstaeif feel
haportaat.
f^gfrUffifcy, t*or„ gyf>fio^^^i,,Q^y-ILi^a4 ^gcs,.; iouai ^ccofflitfon
To taake the very beat use of technical personnel
«
aona^cgient auet cmcourajie-*aad provide mans for coatinui.
professional t&k 1&ere£ore, whether ha liisaa it or net,
the easiaeer*cH&a@er will hiWW itwolv. .. pmfaaMomt
^evelopcsent progress. Today*a rapidly appending technology
dcsaaads its subordinates escpect It; and eosapaay * interest
requires it.
& .*tunitY for professional growth mud professional
racogaitimia is one of the oast Important incentives* It is practically
impossible to hire and keep enough trained engineers to do the work an
organisation wmh^k done, lliis fflftanff engineers laest be developed.
Development io a rasay-edgae* sword. Nat only does it provide the enterprise
with the talent it needs, hut it encourages engineers to stay on with the
orgaai- ... m» And with developattsat will cotae recognition.
The opportunity to write technical papers and appear at technical
aeetiags and conventions ewet be afforded all engineera in the organisation.
Xn this way the engineer will get reeogait: - ^side his own organisation.
280eorse A* Barter* "Tbn Skied for Professional Development,^
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St* side effects of recognition add to the ralti-edged sword of professional
developiaent. Becognitlon heaped on the individual spills ever on his
organisation. If the organisation has a reputation for having a fine
development: program and is feaowa to employ reeognis-ed leaders in the
engineering field, the finest young men with the greatest potential will
he attract it.
In any organisation vhicL expects to achieve any degree of
excellence in engineering, heavy essphasis mtat be placed on developing the
people who do the work and then <m recogalsin r excellence. There la
no other way to build and tsaintain a first rate engineering organisation.
George A. von Feterffy reported la the Hana&fl«ent Eavicu that
during the 1957 Harvard Graduate School of Business survey cited earlier,
an observation was saade that eighty-one pet cent of the places visited had
poor physical cocking condition. . Four out of five provided working
conditions which saade concentration and iaentai efficiency .cult.
. &• Breetse of tfeatlngnoaea Electric Corporation, writing on fTbe
Importance of Engineering Facilities," said that the talents of the brightest
engineer from the finest school nay be ^mtcd unless ha la given proper
facilities.^ But iri&at are proper facilities? the typical engineer's
/on Peterffy, lot, clfc.
ia




work place is a large, barn- like drafting room with endless rows of drafting
tables and desks jammed against drawing files and blueprint machines.
Would it be a waste of money to provide individual, well-organized, neat,
modern work areas for these professional contributors? Might they work
better if they had good conference rooms, a comfortable lounge area? Might
they think the organisation thought them important if they had really proper
facilities?
And what of favorable working atmosphere? VJkat is it? Perhaps if
the other incentives were forcibly used, this one would take care of itself.
If management developed a sincere concern for the engineer and showed it by
actions, the resulting atmosphere would be invigorating and stimulating.
Instilling; a Sense of Confidence
Perhaps the most difficult, but nonetheless necessary, part of this
list of non-financial incentives is imparting to each engineer a sense that
management has a fundamental faith and confidence in his ability and in
his industry. *• This requires a certain amount of tolerance on the part of
managers. Relatively minor mistakes must be expected. Management reaction
to error must be aimed at building confidence and experience. If a manager
lets his own disappointment at failure goad him into venting his anger on
an engineer who was doing the best he knew how, self-confidence will die.
This is not to say that error on routine work should be tolerated. But when
•'Peters, loc. cit .
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trial and error is involved, It is obvious there will be error.
oust continuously and generously give of its suppor .
Part of this feeling of confidence cooes, as does a wholescw©
working atnespherc» from forcible application of the rest of the non-financial
incentives, a jaan who is participating in a strong professional development
ill be gaining confidence in hiasclf . A sum who is faade to feel
that taanageejsnt is interested in hta, will grow in his own eves. But asking
activating him to do store and better uork, will be of no avail if there is
not an adequate organisational framework within which to work and if the
work is not controlled. tibet kind of an organisation and what kind of a
sentreX systesa will function smoothly without nullifying the effects of u
financial incentives?
She answer to this question is by no moan? clear. Because the
Question 4c»#lft with human hftf.ngff and the environment in which fffffw* beings
aust work, there are a number of divergent views em how an engineering
group should be organised and how the work should be controlled.
In regard to the first, a variety of approaches to engineering
organisation have euergod recently, lie have discipline-type organisations;
grouping into separate entities, mechanical, electrical, and chemical
engineers. Phase o atious have also been tried in which the work is
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carried through successive stages by different groups: research, develojsaant,
design, etc. There ore product»typs orsaniisatiottai grouplogs with oil the
accessory disciplines for support of a single product contained in a single
of engineering projects, the systems orseaisatioii h&s i*ecn developed.
All of these concepts work vhea applied to lltWHeM for ubicb they ore
suited if there are built Into the organisations certain essential
eharacterietl
s
The organisational structure oust be clear-cut. Throughout this
cleer-cat organisation there oust be proper delegation of authority. In
tor for chc first two characteristics to help the organise*. . rk
erly there needs to he a strong coaraunicatiomi aystea. The people in
the organisation oust cxahanfo Infonaation and understanding easily,
constantly, and clearly. The organisation saust have good planning, Planning
saast be cerapiete, defining objectives, oechaaisas, and target points. The
fifth essential characterise ic is superior leadersh
,
HhSSlf these
ingredients the organisation will not function effectively ao sat- bow
it is structured or forced. On the other hand, if an essotnatioa of an
existing organisation shows it to have the five charac- or
ingredients Bentioaed above, no natter what the grouping concept usee, the
chances are excellent that it v/iil function veil.





Passing en to control, F. £, Lewsnce MQ
It goes without saying . . . that any succos. ation
must have the necessary cheeks and control stabiish
whether or not the planned schedule is being attained. Fropar
controls arc one of the signs of efficient administration, and
affective planning should provide a control meehanlvaa without
any of the negative effects which hinder a dynamic group.
For the next few pages various management systems will be examined. It will
be apparent that the systems discussed arc arranged in a definite order.
The first system is the most rigid and most definite. The last system
discussed is hardly a control system at all, but is, instead, a good example
of dynamic leadership.
The first of these systems was described in April, 1957, by I. Kevin
Falley of Temco Aircraft Corporation, now Ling-Teace-Vought.^ lie termed
the Tesaeo system the "feedback" approach to managing an engineering
-•nidation. The basic feature of this concept is a good communications
loop. The coojaunications loop assures that after the person in charge,
the director in this ease, gives directions to the system, the results are
measured on a continuing basis and are presented to him. If the results
are unsatisfactory, the directions are changed or reemphasised. The
important concept is that the system is not just left alone after the
original directions are given. The input is adjusted any time reports show
the output does not conform to the plan. This system provides for positive
direction, for correction of it6 own errors, and for smooth, efficient
34lbld,
**t* Kevin Falley, "Frogramaing, Scheduling, and Evaluating
Engineering Assignments—the Feedback Approach," Problems and Practices in
fngjnecring Management , ed. Elisabeth Starting (Hew York: American Kaaagcment
ssociation, 1957), ^. 87-97.
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operation—all by deans of "feedback.
Because at Tesaco the jobs are usually rather large, they lend
themselves veil to extremely detailed breakdown, planning* estimating, and
scheduling. Hr. Paliey puts particular emphasis on the assignment of
responsibility. Sesponsibilit for each small portion of the work is fixed.
Every responsible person knows what he is expected to do, how nany manbours
he has to do it, and when he is expected to finish. Detailed reports keep
management advised of overall progress: on schedule or not; estimated vs.
actual maoiiour expenditures; forecasted drawings released vs. actual drawings
released; and forecasted distribution of manbours vs. actual distribution
of manbours. These reports, on a weekly basis, provide the feedback
management uses to keep the output as desired. The reports are reviewed
at weekly meetings attended by the directors of the various divisions and
the vice president engineering. Assessments are made and modifications of
inputs are decided upon, lianagenent is constantly aware of the status of
all engineering effort in the enterprise. Management directs the operation
in detail. This is a tight management system and it apparently works for
this company.
The second system Is also one used by an aircraft manufacturer,
as devised by Hr. A* T. Hattlson, Jr., a man who gained experience in
production cost control in the automobile industry. Hr. Hattison, now
controller of Republic Aviation Corporation, was kind enough to provide
a description of the system. His description is quoted here in full.
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lb begin with,, we started with two fundamental premise ,
One was that the Engineering Administration Department would
do the controlling and estiiaating of their costs, and the Controller'!
Department would act in the area of advice and surveillance. The
reason for this premise was that Engineering in itself is the
controlling of very skilled personnel, and the assembling of a
large number of figures, facts and data alone could not measure
accomplishment* The second premise was that your original
estimate must he prepared in great detail and should be as accurate
as is humanly possible. It was our belief that many overruns of
Engineering costs were not due to lack of control, but due mainly
to the fact that you underestimated the tack originally. Years
ago when X first entered the budgeting field, we used to
laughingly &M^ f "Our problem is quite simple. Either our
estimate was tee lev or our costs were too high, but we sure
don't knew which it It."
tea an estimate is prepared in the Engineering Department,
it is accomplished by outlining by each one of the twenty-seven
divisions their casks to be accomplished and an expenditure
chart by each department related to time for their tasks.
These individual estimates are furnished to the Engineering
Administration Department and consolidated into an over-all tins
expenditure schedule or chart. Shortly before a division starts
work on a task, a work order is issued for that task with its
estimated hours and its time period of expenditure. On a weekly
basis, time is recorded against the individual tasks and the
accumulated expenditures are compared to the time chart originally
forecast. This compilation tells us that we are spending our
Engineering hours in accordance with the plan, and that timed to
Engineering hours we are ahead of schedule, behind schedule or on
schedule. This alone ia sot enough. Ha could very well be
exactly on schedule as to expenditures against time and still be
in the throes of an overrun because the task accomplishment might
not equal the expenditures*
This is where the cost surveillance comes into play and
regardless of how closely you survey the accomplishments of the
task, you could be completely misled without the full cooperation
of the supervisor of each division. Our supervisors have been
convinced that it is to everyone's advantage to watch each task
expenditure against accomplishment, and if It becomes apparent
that it Is going to take more hours to perform this task than
was originally anticipated, Engineering Administration be notified
at the earliest possible moment. Where a certain task is known
to be exceeding original expenditures, it can well be that other
areas have undcrruns and hours can be transferred between areas.
Actually we are not so concerned about our performance on each
individual task and division as we are in the fact that Ml do
not wish the Job to overrun in the whole.
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Located in the Engineering Department is an Assistant
Controller from the Controller's Office who is constantly on
the lookout for any possible overrun in any area. The selection
of this person can not be overemphasized because he must be a
well-qualified engineer who has sufficient knowledge of budgets
to thoroughly understand his own task. He laust also be given
considerable power of control. An example of this is in the
scheduling of manpower to the divisions to perform the tasks in
the time period* Additional personnel can not: be assigned to
a group or division without his approval , and should a request
come to him for additional personnel in a given area which is
greater than the planned load to accomplish the known task, ha
then has a good "clue" that this department is either working
ahead of schedule or is facing an overrun. This is one of our
bast points of control.
Manpower forecast charts by contract are exceedingly
important and used extensively. The expenditure reports by jobs
are prepared weekly for hours and converted to dollars with
overhead expenditures added only monthly.
Every contract is under the direct management supervision of
a program manager who is responsible for all phases of the contract,
and it is through the program manager mainly that the information
regarding the accomplishment of the scheduled work is obtained.
On the smaller contracts, a single person may be program manager
for several contracts.
We can not overemphasize the importance of indoctrinating
the division managers of the Engineering Department with the
importance of watching constantly their accomplishment against
their expenditures. Figures alone Just can not measure
accomplishments, and there should be confidence in these managers
to honestly tell when a job is not performing to schedule. It
is only natural that when any individual knows that if his group
overruns their estimate and it will come to light some time, it
has a good stern effect at making them cost-conscious.
We believe that our premise that Engineering supervision must
be set up to control themselves is of vital importance.
Accountants can not do it and Assistant Controllers, no matter
how many were placed in the department, would not do it unless
the supervision themselves are made conscious of the fact that
they must perform their tasks within the allotted hours or so
notify management as soon as possible.
To send you forms, reporting mechanisms and charts would be
of little value because it truly is not the mechanics that control
the cost, but the desire of the supervisors to do the job at the
price wa originally estimated. It is fundamental that each

operating group must know currently and quickly their
expenditures to date, oat they alone can measure their
accomplishments. *o
It is particularly interesting to note the emphasis Mr* ..ison
puts on placing responsibility -he engineering supervisor. In this
cost measurement system, one that for a successful airframe
manufacturer, the division, rk of which is being measured, is
responsible for preparing the estimates originally and the division
supervisor is responsible for assessing progress as the work goes along.
This §} Ixeps management apprised of work progress, but because the men
whose p -s being checked participated in the preparation of the
estimates and b. they are responsible for making the progress reports,
the adverse psychological effects of a "control 5 * system arc largely avoided.
This is an information system, but one which allows management to exercise
the direction necessary to keep costs in line and to meet time schedules.
The use of two cxaupi. Mtk control from the aircraft industry
might seem owe of place here were it act for the fact that the kind of work
done by these firms is not unlike that done in a civil engineering
organisation. In an article in the August, 1961, Consulting Engineer ,
John Gir&ad describes a system of managing engineering productivity used
in the consulting engineering 7hich nc is associated."
Letter from A. T. Hattison, Jr., Controller, Sepublic Aviation
Corporation, Farmingdale, Long Island, Mew York, Kerch 9, 1962.
37Glraad, loc. sit .
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The responsibility for preparation of an estimate of the direct
costs which will be involved in the engineering and design work for a
project is made by a project manager. In making this estimate, Mr. Glrand
suggests that an uninitiated project monger keep in mind Finagle 's First
Lav of Revision:
Information necessitate a change in design will be
conveyed to the designer after, and only after, the plans are
complete. 33
When Girand 1 j project nanager has his estimates in final form the
job is broken down into taonthly increments of cost, payroll and direct
Material only. These incrementa are put on a report form on which is
•pace to record actual coats each month and the project manager's est instate
of the percent completion of the design. Mr. Girand consents that a new
project manager is usually shocked to find how fast the supply of money
dwindles and how hard it is to get that last five per cent of completion.
The moral of Mr. Girand* s article is this:
Hot many consultants can afford the luxury of project managers
who consistently underestimate the cost of the engineering
required on the job; who never can get the job completed; or who
insist on engineering the job to death. *J
The three methods of management of work described so far have all
involved, in varying degrees, planning, estimating, scheduling, and progress
:<rting in a more or less formal and systematic way. In each of these






of the engineering organisation. Ail was mentioned curlier, a research
team found this not always the case in the induetrial '..orId, Frequently,
planning, coordination, and control were left completely to the chief
..hose instance* administrative procedures were frequently
confused. 'Getting out the work" took too touch of the time of these men.
Xn addition, 'technically trained executives and managers . . . ore usually
unwilling to believe or to admit that substantial improvements in the level
of engineering productivity can be made," These people are often products
of the system they are managing and they have seldom had administrative
training,
Xn an article entitled, "Getting Store Mileage from Your Engineering
Staff,' George A. von Pcterffy suggests the following basic leadership
techniques to provide work control.
1, Plan all work carefully.
2, Select personnel for assignment to projects on the basis
of availabilit. , interest, and, if it involves group work,
compatibility.
3, Discuss and carefully explain the work and the desired
objective to the engineers.
. Alio-., time for the engineers to study the assignment
and requirement .
5. Jointly agree on and fix a completion date after
recapitulating objectives.
0. Define clearly the responsibility and the scope of
authority delegated.
7. Chad; on progress at regular intervals, and give
necessary assistance and support.
. Evaluate the -cork upon its completion.
9. Review the evaluation with the individuals concerned.
10. Praise as well as criticise and explain he :&
improvements can be made.**
40von Peterffy, ftoc. ,c,^,
41Ibld.

One might observe that this Is simply what one would expect of a
good engineering supervisor. Bat how often do we get what we can expect?
Might not tsoot of the problems of managing engineering manpower vanish if
supervisors assumed these responsibilities?
Another vie--- of the functions of the engineering administrator is
presented by diaries D. Orth, III, in his article "More Productivity from
Engineers." Kr. Orth considers it the function of administrative engineers
to help rather than direct those working for them* According to Kr. Orth,
an administrative engineer should have an understanding of the needs of the
group and of his own operating situation, Uc should provide the vehicle
through which the engineers report to management. Be should interpret
management to the engineer and the engineer to management. The administrator
must stimulate creative imagination by asking cues t ions. Be serve®
ceerdinatc ideas* plans, and services and to protect engineers from
42
pressures,
Mr. Orth*a Ideas would find their greatest application in
.anisai •.quiring a wmxlmm of creativity and Innovation,
have new gone from one end of the spectrum of engineering work
management to the ether* The system used at Temce is c tij$t& ec dt
1 to manage tlie engineering effort involved in turning out a large
volume of drawings for aircraft production, This kind of uark, while
circs extensive engineering knowledge and judgment does not require
a very high degree of creativity and innovation. At the other end el the
spectrum, we saw Mr, Orth'e description of an engineering administrator
.... .
|





whose primary function is to create ant atmosphere in which engineers can
work which will allow their lull creative and innovative potential to emerge,
Seaewherc between these two eatrcacs lies a system which would be applicable
to controlling the \<ork done in the engineering organisation of the Bureau
of Yards and Docks. Xn the next chapter this will be discussed together
with acme ideas for a program of non-financial incentiveo for Bureau of





An easy wsp to develop a program for motivating the engineers of the
Bureau of Yards mid Docks and for managing the *?ork they do weld be to sit
in an armchair and dream up an ideal program and system. Unfortunately*
such a system, conceived in a vacuum of knowledge > would have little chance
of succeeding in a real world. Therefore, the writer spent some time
talking vith people in the Bureau of tarda and Bocks about the existing
situation, the existing environaant, and vfo&t needs to be done.
HEbc first impression perceived is that there is a real awareness
on the part of many in the bureau that the survival of the organisation
depends on its ability to provide technical engineering services to the
Navy. Shis point uao highlighted in a talk by Sear Admiral H, J. Drustrup,
Deputy Chief of the Bureau, on March 27, 1902. SASH Druatrup, speaking to
the Washington Area Juaion Officers* Luncheon, said that he and the chief
of the bureau iasre in agreement that the primary Job of the Civil Engineer
Corps and the Bureau of tarda and Docks is to provide to the Haval Shore
abiislsaent superior technical engineering capability. 1
.ii.i.. m i n i ii i » mm i ni im ii mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmimmtmmmmmn i rn m •—m*mmmm*mmmm~m**~m—m*** m *' t ~m-~*mm—m0m~mm—mmm—~mmi i n i i m in i I
3-Speech by 3AGK H. J. Druatrup, CEC, UBH, Deputy Chief, Bureau of
Yards and docks to Washington Area Junior Officers, Hareh 27, 1962.
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the second impression the writer gained is that while the bureau
has a reputation for providing superior technical engineering capability,
the ice on which the organisation has been skating is getting thin, the
tfnuMffirifl of the Etevy for the kinds of capability the bureau has provided in
the past are increasing in scope and coiaple&ity , 'but in the recent post the
bureau has sat these demands largely by fanning out the work to architect
engineer (ASS) contractors. As a eon—frianre, the :i in house" capability
of the bureau has diminished* In sens areas of engineering there are pockets
of excellence. For example, in crane design the District Public Works
Officer, Ninth Bevel District, has a working capability. But by and large,
to this observer and to others in a position to feast; with whom he has spoken
in recent weeks* the vaunted "in house" capability looks to be acre shadow
than substance.
Combine these two impressions, first, that technical excellence la
the key to survival for the Bureau of Yards and Docks and, second, that
the technical capability of the bureau has been allowed to deteriorate, or
at least has not been made to keep pace with recent developments, and it
becomes obvious that the technical capability of the bureau must be
rejuvenated if the organisation is to survive.
There arc those who will not agree with this concept. There is &
school of thought which says it is unnecessary for the bureau to have
"in house" engineering capability. However, the writer is not one of them.
I fail to see a need for a Bureau of Yards smd Docks if it does not have a
unique and vigorous capability for doing engineering work. :~:*out a
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particular, Hevy oriented, specialised, technical civil engineering
capability *in house" the bureau might better turn its functions ever to
the General Services Adiaiaistratien. Therefore, it seen© to this observer
that a vigorous and sustained program is needed to redevelop on ia house 1 *
engineering capability in the Bureau of Yards and Docks.
As has been stated before, the policy of the bureau ia, },a sufficient
number of design projects of broad scope and complexity will be retained
house 5 to provide for continued staff development, capability* and high
level performance within the organisation of the Bureau of Yards and Socks
2
or its field activities. 1"
In the recent past this policy has been given less than enthusiastic
support. For the fiscal year 1962 military construction program plans and
specifications for twenty-three out of one hundred fifty-six lias items
were prepared ""in house."' That ia nearly fifteen per cent. However, this
percentage is based on numbers of jobs. Figures baaed on construction
centtract price are nearer seven par cent. This means, of course, that the
smaller jobs are the ones which vera done "in house." The fiscal yeex 1963
proposed military construction program contains two hundred eighteen line
items for which preliminary engineering reports have been prepared. Twenty-
five per cent of these were done "in house," but this is not necessarily an
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Why is this so? UUy, v?ifch a policy audi aa stated above, has 1
more ''in bouse" engineering; work been don&f The answer is contained in
another question, tfhat have the engineers heen doing in recent years which
they can now stop doing so they can devote their time to more challenging
work? they have been doing the kind of work which is difficult to find
others to do; the annually funded repair projects, the cheeking of drawings*
i
the multitude of special jobs. They oust continue to do this. What does
this kind of work do to the capability of a design force? It surely does
not stimulate and challenge it. It dulls it. Perhaps then, as X have
alleged above, the bureau really does not, in fact, have muck "in house'
capability. If this is so, then having a policy such as stated above is not
enough • An order which is Impossible of execution is better not given, at
least until circumstances are altered to make execution possible. The
circumstance needing altering is the state of the technical engineering
capability of the bureau. How can it be changed?
There is at the present time in Washington, among highly placed
officials, a propensity to inject into their comments en the world situation
a phrase to the effect that we must boar in mind that there are no simple
solutions to the vexing problems facing us. This is such a problem. So one
action will solve it,
A long-range , integrated program is needed. At least five things
should be done. They are:
w i nri iiiin m m ii.i i—MMM—
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^Interview with Mr, W, R. Sttnchcum, Engineering and Architectural
Design Branch Manager, Bureau of Yards and Doc!;,;, March 28, li>62.
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1. Rebuild the technical knowledge of the engineering personnel.
2. Change the structure o£ the organisation to provide non-
supervisory promotion channels.
3. Provide professional challenge,
4. Develop a system to assure a continuing workload for individual
officer.
5. Improve physical working conditions.
The first of these steps, rebuilding the technical knowledge of the
inecring personnel, is a two part step. First, the input of engineers
at the bottom of the organisation must be assured, and second, a carefully
formulated program for development of engineers must be instituted. The
bureau has in existence a going program of professional training and
development for young college graduates. This is a bright spot in the
picture. A number of good people have ccsae out of this program. However,
the input is being tapered off. Three years are required for the bureau to
realise benefit from a trainee taken into the program this year. Therefore,
if there is a need for a continuing input of high caliber talent at the
bottom of the organisation, now is the time to re-emphasise the engineer
trainee program.
The second part of the first step is to institute a development
program for engineers now employed and those who will come in later. In
August of 1960, the then deputy chief of the bureau directed that a plan be
^Interview with Mr. M, B. Lewis, Bureau of Yards and Docks Code
1-311,1, March 31, 1962.
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prepared to provide for the development and selection of key civilian
personnel in the bureau. After nearly a year of study an ad hoe committee
presented a caa&xdhca&tvc report which outlines a workable plan of
development and selection. If Elemented, this plan would provide a firm
foundation on which the bureau could rebuild its engineering work force,
The plan envisions a continuation of the policy of treating the
bureau and all its field activities as one manpower pool for career planning,
development, and selection, Under the plan the manpower pool would be
broken down into functional groupings for career taanaynpnt purposes, the
key to the plan is an annual inventory of key personnel and their
accomplishments. Of critical importance in this plan is that although the
bureau and its field organisation is considered to he a single manpower
pool, each engineer who chooses to participate in the plan is thought of as
an Individual and a separate development plan is prepared for him by his
supervisor.
Provision would ha made to give tuition support to key personnel
tainting to further their education on their own time. In addition, each
year KM* "scholarships" for full-time schooling, e<*ulvaient to a master's
degree, would be awarded in each of four functional areas--design,
construction, maintenance, and "all other" including management, to quote
II III I > il II I I II I II I I l iM P W * ' l> III H II S I ' l HI ' I f I 1 I i n I Wi'll H I III l .11. Ii II
•aww*www»wa*W>WMwW w>Jfc%we www *'^^»»1*S»*J' *##*«»W*4* J iSM»«Sjt^BaflSla W» <fc-(fcjr ^a*4B» U«ftU wvawi
August 30, I960.
^Letter from Ad Hoc Committee on 2eplacemeat of Key Civilian Personnel,
Bureau of Yards and Decks, July 5, 1961.
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from the pica, 'these scholarships would be awarded to applicants £roa the
Bureau or field v;*hu have demonstrated the highest degree of actual etui
potential value to the Bureau, sad whose educational plana are of greatest
value to the Bureau*" The plea also suggests the possibility teat educational
courses equivalent to Ph. B. retirements might be authorised.
The plan provides that all headquarters and field key jobs vould
constitute a single competitive area mid that ail participants in the
development plan would be considered for selection to key positio&s in their
mm functional area. In line with this concept of a single manpower pool
and single competitive area, bureau representatives would participate in
selections for hey jobs in the field.
An Important feature of the above plan is that the maapouer pool
vould be broken down into functional groupings. The grouping with vhich
#*)•*«»• jfr^Sifi™1**** *fc%r **»*"*i^w» H*^»* •»a%*^'**,^PaW^"%* mfr^m WMaif \*imi **S"J?»<fcaa^lfWi>>fc MtWR ^BpSBw* ^^^fc* • . !»# ^^SS^* ^'ifc wMW
weak characteristics of this particular functional area is that, while the
importance of providing a line of promotion outside the administrative chain
la covered &w$oently in engineerias-man##Bmemt literature, there is no ouch
line in the organisation of the Bureau of Yards and Bocks. Therefore, the
second major point in the five point program is that the organisational
structure of the engineering and design organisation of the bureau must be
changed to provide such a line of promotion.
The Civil Service reflations provide for grades ia the bureau of
G&-15 non-supervisory engineers and in the field for GS-14 non-supervisory
engineers. A hierarchy of positions free GS-ll throng GS-15 non-supervisory
engineers can, therefore, be set up in the engineering and design
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organization of the bureau. Such a hierarchy would allow an engineer
wished to concentrate his efforts on becoaiug a better end more valuable
professional contributor to do this and at the sane tine receive rewards
cowaeasurete with bis increasing ability to contribute.
One of the objections that might be raised to this proration system
is that it would result in having engineers rising outside the administrative
chain working for eaginecr-raanagers who vera paid leas and who were of lower
rank than they, This is not an insurmountable problem. At the present tine
military officers ore frequently paid less than the civilians they supervise.
What is rehired is that administrative engineers function nere responsibly
and aore humanly, they would have to obtain the cooperation of non-supervisory
engineers by persuasion, hy tact, and, where necessary, by employing the
authority of wore senior line officials $m the organisation. In any ever:
it is something which needs to be done. If difficulties are encountered
they will have to be evercaatt*
The third step In the five step pragma is the one which is new
being given first consideration* this step is to provide professional
challenge. The way this should be done is gradually to increase the eraphasis
on the policy that ''in house" capability will be used rare often to do the
work involved in design projects of bread scope and easiplasity. Admittedly
.-e are conditions existing at the present ciac, particularly a decreasing
budget be t* and. laaiateannec funds with which to support
ensineering personnel, which con force the hand of aanagensnt. it stay be
that aore "in house* 1 work will have to be dene before tlic organisation Is

really geared to do it. If this is the case, top management In the bureau
oust be prepares! to accept less than perfect results. This is part of the
price that will have to be paid for past policy and future engineerias
excellence.
The fourth major point is that a way of doing business has to be
developed so that engineering groups in the ficld organisation of the bureau
can be assured of a continuing year to year workload. This trill require
aggressive attention la at least two areas, because two problems are involved*
The first problem is that throughout a single year the vorkload fluctuates
dramatically. The second problem is that the geographical emphasis of the
military construction program changes from year to year and in the past has
caused the workload in engineering and design groups in the field engineering
organisations of the bureau to fluctuate. Neither of these conditions
provides the kind of stability needed to develop a sense of security on the
part of ensineer employee . chout this sense of security the engineers
who can do so Will look for employment where they can get it, where they
are thought of as a resource that must be husbanded.
The first problem, that of smoothing out the workload throughout a
single year, has never been attacked on a massive basis at departmental
level to develop a doctrine of operation and manasement for a desl
animation. A massive attack is maded by a special ad hoc coscittee
composeJ of bureau personnel, departmental and field, and management analysts
from consulting firms, unparalleled imagination and, perhaps, radical
departure from established practice have to be the ingredients of committee
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action such as this if workable solutions are to be developed. Total,
aggressive, raanageaent support action •ri.ll be needed to ixxplmasnt the solutions.
This problem has tsecaa a stubborn and naggins one* It *?ill not be overcome
by a timid approach.
The second problem, that of the varying geographical emphasis of
the military construction program,, lends itsalf to solution by Jusu such a
radical departure frew previous bureau practice. The concept of "contracting
out" is well fcncxra and has been used, perhaps too tmich, in recent years.
But the idea of "contracting jy&" can provide the kind of leveling feature
$&&&&& to solve this second fluctuating workload problem. If, for instance
,
the design wrkload in the Philadelphia field of." em dropping off, but
the vorkload in Norfolk lealng \x^ t %jhat prevents the officer in charge
of construction in Iterfolk "hiring" the Philadelphia office to do some of
his writ just as he might hire an architect-engineer. If the Philadelphia
office uere qualified to do the vatfc and had the capacity available, this
action would be entirely feasible* travel costs and travel speeds are
such that distance is no longer a problem, Ifec office "letting" the work
could be just as demanding of another bureau office as of an architect-
engineer contractor; perhaps even more so* undoubtedly, there are problems
in tliis idea \ihich have not occurred to this observer, but problems are made
for overcoming. And if the bureau is to progress, problems must be solved.
The fifth and last step in this five step program is to improve the
physical tasking conditions of our engineers. The American ISenagament
Association is quoted by John Girand as having made the statement: "The
'

easiest tray to waste engineering personnel is to have then yotk la poorly
equipped laboratories; to crowd them together in noisy, substandard working
quarters; or to scatter then so they cannot eoawunicatc ade<|uately with each
otJ*r.»8 Su«l7 oar peopia «rc c«*«te* tetter in noisy, riMMM
A typical example of this is the Engineering and Architectural Design
Branch in the departmental organisation of the Bureau of Yards and Docks.
Several designs have been prepared to make the spaces devoted to engineering
md architectural design attractive, quiet, utilitarian, and well lit.
the funds rehired, estimated at $40*000, have bean recuested a number of
tinea, but have never been approved. Beanwhile, attractive working spaces
have boen provided elsewhere In the bureau. In coxae of these spaces
functions are performed which seem to the engineers to be of less importance
to the bureau than theirs.
As part of the effort to rebuild an iaaco of engineering competence
In the bureau and its engineering field offices, the importance of adequate
working quarters should be emphasised frost the point of view not only of
the psychological effect on the engineer employee, but also of the effect
on customers visiting the premises.
As "side effects" to these five steps the other needs for ncm-financis;
incentives for engineerc will be well on the road to satisfaction. The




the development program will be training managers better to eossaunicate with
and mu and the needs of professional contributors. Providing a stable
workload, a continuing development program, an enlightened promotion system,
challenging work, and a deep feeling of appreciation of the importance of
engineering to the bureau will instill in every professional employee a sense
of confidence and purpose.
These steps will improve the quality and increase the quantity of
engineering output, but what about managing the work?
Ma. rk
Discussions with a number of people in the bureau indicate there is
no clear-cut understanding of what is being sought. For so many years
bureau people have talked about the ideas of the maintenance control program,
that now they know no others. One of the first concepts which must be
understood if the output of engineers is to be utilised effectively is a
different idea of control than bureau people are used to hearing. Hie
semantics of this s?ord have been the subject of raging controversy for years.
But because we have to use the word, we must understand its meaning, at
least as applied herein. For our purposes, control does not mean the turning
of knobs, regulating or directing the work. The concept of control as we
are speaking of it here involves streams of information. Control as used
here is nearly synonomous with the word communication.
We arc seeking to know if the work is proceeding according to plan.
This is all that a system of control will provide, and even achieving this
is difficult. Compromises have to be made, inefficiencies have to be
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accepted* What is being sought is a reasonably accurate and timely picture
of what la going on in the or$aaisatiott shown against a background el what
was planned, With this montage in band the manager can then direct. It is
most important for all concerned to understand that the control system ia
not an evaluation tool and that it provides no direction. Direction and
performance evaluation are functions of qanaaers. not of systosas.
8ev can a control systcu provide a Rentage of what is going on ia an
ion shown against a background of what was planned? First, the
plan has to be made. This plan provides one mental picture for the manager.
Separate and distinct free the plan is a reporting system which provides the
manager with a second picture, a picture of the working situation as it
actually exists at a moment in tlxae. These pictures are the two atresias of
information which constitute the control system. The manager integrates
these two streams of information, forming the montage, and evaluating the
real situation against the plan* The manager thro decides whether or not the
real situation is a close enough approximation to the plan. If it is, ha
takes no further management action. If it is not, he must revise the plan,
or have it revised, and comssmicate this revision to subordinates in the form
of supplemental or changed directions. It cannot be emphasised strongly
performance of the work.
A controversial $*esti<ra is who should prepare the first picture,
the plan? In a^gtwaairing and design this should be a joint effort. Top




These work requirements; must be estimated and then scheduled. The estimates
can 'seat be prepared by the man who does the work. Vigorous objections I
this practice are usually made by those who understand neither the relationship
which should assist between a supervisor and an engineer nor the purpose of
a control system. The supervisor is supposed to be an caeperienced engineer
who has sane idea of box/ much time it should take to do the kind of work
which falls under his supervision* Together, he and the engineer can arrive
at agreement on a reasonable estimate of the number of manhours needed to do
a job. Management must understand that this estimate will be wrong . It may be
way off. But this is not supposed to be a standard i it is supposed to be a
part of a plan. Even so, experience has shown that though it is cxtraaely
difficult to estimate the number of manhours of a particular discipline
required in a Job, the overall manhours required can usually be estimated
with stane degree of accuracy. The estimated work requirements, including a
work requirement for consultation and one for little jobs*® axe incorporated
into a loose schedule. Each work requirement estimate is then broken down
to show the number of manhours that would have to be spent during successive
intervals of time to insure that ail the matshoura would be spent by the time
the work requirement is scheduled to be completed. This forms the first
picture.
The second picture is farmed by a stream of information from the
individual supervisors. On a periodic basis, the period being the same as
the interval of time into which the work requirement estimates were broken,
^A minor innovation is that a number of little jobs would be combined
into one work requirement. The single major work requirement would then be
rather than a number of small work requirements.
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the supervisors report the actual number of manhours applied to the work
requirement during the period and their own estimate of the percentage of
completion of the work rcquircracat . lihen this information, which forme the
picture of the lurking situation as it actually exists at a mcraent in time,
is shows to the manager* ha can compare it to the first picture. It cannot
he anticipated that the tvo pictures will ever look alike. Xhe important
thing is that the aaneser is informed that the two pictures do not look
alike, lie then is in a position to raanage, to rearrange the work force and
the schedule if the two pictures are too different. He is spared surprises*
He does not have the devastating experience of hitting a deadline and
suddenly finding the job but fifty per cent complete.
It is apparent that this system is derived in part from the Eepubiic
Aviation Corporation system described earlier in this paper, 3we paragraphs
from that part of the paper deserve repetition here:
cannot overemphasise the importance of indoctrinating
the division managers of the Engineering apartment with the
tanee of MHUffliti .tantly their accomplishment against
.mditures. Fibres alone just cannot measure
aomplisbments, and there should be confidence in these
max to honestly tell t&oa a job is not performing to
schedule. It is only natural that when any individual knows
that if his group overruns their estimate and it will come
to light somet&xe, it has a good stern effect on making them
cost-conscious.
We believe that our premise that Engineering supervision must
be set up to control themselves is of vital importance.
Accountants cannot do it and Assistant Controllers, no matter
how many were placed in the department, would not do it unless
the supervision themselves are made conscious of the fact
that they must perform their tasks within the allotted hours




It is the belief of this observer that ttxse remains for the Bureau
of Yards sad Socks to resale Its position as e leader in the engineerin&
field. However, vigorous steps such as outlined herein are needed now,
And if a decision is laede to go forward with a program such as this, a
'''control" systoa had best be set up to give laanagwaent the t» pictures,
the plan for i^rovonant and the existing situati. iherwlsc, the force




The nation, facing a demand for engineer., ufcicl. is rapidly
outstricing the supply, needs to train more engineers, but also needs to
better utilise those already trained, Two ways are available to improve
utilisation. Hie first is better management of the man; the second is better
management of the t*ork.
Batter management of the man boils down to training and motivating
each engineer to do more and finer \x*rk than he thinks he can d. . ri
1. Devise a non-supervisory promotion chain.
2. Challenge the professional with difficult Mfu
3. Tolerate individuality.
4. aaiae engineers * stature and include than in 'Wtagenent."
5. Improve working apneas.
6. Foster professional growth and recognition.
7. Instill self-confidence*
To do these things in the Bureau of tarda and Docks requires a number
of a The first one is the hardest and the most important. Managers
must star the ? . The bureau can again be an




sustained^ intelligent work and personal interest are needed to make this
possibility a reality. Devising s net* promotion scheme, creating s working
development program, finding challenging work, making s new atmosphere trill
need a great and sustained driving force. Overcoming inertia will be
exhausting of itself. But continuous energy input is needed to keep an
organisation such as this accelerating*
As far as managing; the work is concerned, it is a matter of adapting
a iystssi which world cisevhf the conditions oal M and
its field organisation operate. The one suggested herein i& reasonably
workable, provided someone is willing to stake it work. It will not manage
the work. Stat is the manager *s job. If the manager concentrates on
managing rather than on "getting out the work," a montage such as described
herein of two pictures, planned and actual conditions, is all that is needed.
This scheme will provide the information the manager needs to manage. But
like any control device, it must be used by the manager to produce results.
The manager is the dynamic, life giving element in every
business. Without his leadership the "resources of production"
remain resources and never become production. 2
Finally, one point needs mora emphasis. If rebuilding the engineering
stature of the Bureau of Yards and Docks is to be undertaken, a program must
be devised to embrace the total issue. When dealing with complex human
situations such as this, simple solutions can have a fatal allure. Simple
1Drucker considers manpower the "human resource.
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solutions belong with sisaplc probiesaa. Since this is a laanageaaent problem
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